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STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
AND THE POLICE POWER.
State laws based on the theory that modern industrial conditions
require remedies for the protection of employees different from
those developed at common law and by statutes in modification
thereof, have been increasing in number during the last five years.
It is urged by the supporters of this legislation that on broad eco-
nomic and social grounds the loss of earning power caused by
injuries to workmen should be figured as part of the cost of produc-
tion to the employer. On behalf of the employers it is contended
that no man should be made to pay for damage suffered through no
fault of his, and in spite of his best effort to prevent it.
Under our system of written constitutions these enactments have
been subject to attack as violative of the "due-process" clause found
in one form or another in all the constitutions, and have been de-
fended as representing a proper exercise of the police power of the
legislatures. If the value of this legislation be admitted the question
remains as to how the taking of property required by it can be
justified in the face of the "due-process" clauses. In the Ives case
(201 N. Y. 271) the arguments against a definition of the police
power which would restrict the operation of the "due-process"
clause and justify the taking contemplated in the statute are very
clearly set forth.
The Ives case was an action by an employee against his em-
ployer under article 14a of the Labor Law of New York.1 This
addition to the law of the state was modeled upon the English Work-
men's Compensation Act of 1897, and provided that every employer
engaged in any of the industries classified by the act (and thereby
determined to be especially dangerous), should be directly liable for
any injury to employees resulting from a "necessary risk or danger
of the employment or one inherent in the nature thereof."'2
By the act the liability of the employer for failure to exercise
due care or to comply with any law was retained, the only excep-
tions in his favor being in cases where the injury was caused by the
1Laws 1910, Ch. 674.2No. 217a.
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intoxication or serious and willful misconduct of the workman.3
The determination of amounts payable in certain cases was fixed 4
and the employee given his option of suit under the act or under the
laws of the state previous to the act.5
The court held the statute void under the state constitution on
the ground that the liability sought to be imposed on the employers
classified by the act amounted to a taking of property without due
process of law. They said that the act could not be sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power because it was not a law of regu-
lation,-it did nothing to conserve health, safety or morals of the
employees and imposed no new or affirmative duties on the employer
in the conduct of his business, its sole purpose being to make him
liable for injuries which might be sustained wholly without his fault.
The decisions in the then recent cases of Noble State Bank v. Has-
kell6 and Assaria State Bank v. Dolley7 were urged upon the court
as indicating an apparent extension of the limits of the police power8
sufficient to include the legislation before them, but Judge Werner
refused to recognize the cases as controlling in construing the state
constitution.9
Because of the pioneer character of the act under consideration
and the interest of various labor organizations in its passage, the
decision in the Ives case was subject to considerable criticism. In
1913 an amendment'0 to the New York constitution was adopted
which provided that nothing in that instrument should be construed
to limit the power of the legislature to enact laws for the protection
of the lives, health, or safety of employees, or for payment by em-
ployers of compensation, and the following year a new compensation
act (Consol. Laws, c. 67; Laws 1914, c. 41) was passed, differing
from the former law in that instead of imposing a direct liability
on the employer it gave the election of insuring in the state fund,
with any proper company, or of giving proof of his own financial
SNo. 217b.
4No. 219a.
5 No. 218.
6219 U. S. 104, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062.
7219 U. S. 121.
s219 U. S., p. 111, "It may be said in a general way that the police power
extends to all the great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S.
518 It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly
and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
OWerner, J., thought the act invalid under the Federal Constitution as
wll as under that of the State. 201 N. Y., at p. 298.
f'See Laws 1914, Vol. 3, p. 2372 (N. Y. Cons., Sec. 19, Art. I).
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ability to pay.1 By insuring as described or by paying the pre-
scribed compensation in each case, the employer was relieved from
all further liability.12 The employee might not claim damages under
the rule in negligence cases, the compensation being based solely
on the loss of earning power.
Before this new act had become law, however, the highest courts
of several states had passed on the validity of statutes similar in
effect to that declared void in the Ives case. The Justices of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts delivered a favorable advance
opinion"s on the validity of the state law; in a Washington case
(State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen), 14 the Supreme Court
of that state, while recognizing the force of the Ives case as a pre-
cedent, expressly refused to follow it. Although the act under con-
sideration in Cunningham v. Northwestern Improv. Co.' was held
invalid by the Montana court in that the employer, having paid his
insurance premium, might, notwithstanding, be held for damages,--
there being no provision made for his reimbursement from the state
"1No. 50, entitled: "Security for payment of Compensation," describes
three modes in which the employer may secure compensation to his em-
ployees: (1) by subscribing to the state fund, (2) by filing a copy of con-
tract or policy of insurance with the commission, or (3) by furnishing
satisfactory proof to the commission of his financial ability to pay. The
penalty for failure to comply with these provisions is fixed at one dollar
per day per man employed; the employer also loses certain defenses by
No. 11.12 No. 53: "* * * relieved from all liability for personal injuries or
death sustained by his employees, and the persons entitled to compensation
under this chapter shall have recourse therefor only to the state fund and
not to the employer."
'
3 The text may be found in 209 Mass. 607 (July 24th, 1911). The act is
similar to the New York act of 1914, supra.
1465 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466; decided Sept.
27th, 1911. The Ives case was decided in March of the same year. The
opinion in the principal case contains much matter dealing with the ques-
tion as to whether an act imposing tort liability on one who is not negligent
is a violation of any fundamental right. The argument is the familiar
one that the law of negligence is not such a fundamental principle of our
law as to be rendered inviolate by the due process clause of our constitu-
tions. See note in 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, and 10 Columbia Law Review,
p. 753. The decision does not go on this ground, however, but on the
broader basis that such enactments are within the police power of the
legislature. Opinion of Fullerton, J, at p. 195: "If, therefore, the act in
controversy has a reasonable relation to the protection of the public
health, morals, safety or welfare, it is not to be set -aside because it
may incidentally deprive some person of his property without fault, or
take the property of one person to pay the obligations of another. To be
fatally defective in these respects, the regulation must be so utterly un-
reasonable and so extravagant in nature and purpose as to capriciously
interfere with and destroy public rights."
1544 Mont. 180, 117 Pac. 554 (Nov., 1911), quoting with approval the
Washington cpse, sufra.
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fund, yet this court adopted the language of State Bank v. Haskell
in defining the police power and sustained the declared power of the
legislature to pass a compulsory insurance law. The Wisconsin
statute is of the elective type; that is, the employer may defend his
suit in court deprived of the defenses embodied in the fellow-servant
rule and the doctrine of assumption of risk, contract provisions not-
withstanding. While this act provides that election and recovery
under its provisions bars the employee from further remedy, and so
is not open to the objection raised in the Montana case, supra, the
court in declaring the act valid'0 took the opportunity to express
their views on the validity of the legislation under the state consti-
tution. While in the above cases the decisions rested on the theory
that the acts under consideration were actually within the police
power of the legislatures as shown by analogous decisions, the Wis-
consin court dealt with the question as one of the methods to be
pursued in construing a written constitution. "Where there is no
express command or prohibition," said the court, "but only general
language or policy to be considered, the conditions prevailing at the
time of its adoption must have their due weight; but the changed
social, economic, and governmental conditions and ideals of the
time, as well as the problems which the changes have produced, must
also logically enter into the consideration, and become influential
factors in the settlement of the problems of construction and inter-
pretation.' 7 This expression is in contrast to the suggestion made
by Judge Werner in the Ives case to the effect that if the people of
the state desired the law in question they should amend the constitu-
tion.' 8 What is perhaps the strongest statement of the doctrine
that public policy determines constitutionality under the due-process
clauses is found in the Washington case, supra, where the court
declared that in order to be fatally defective the legislation must be
shown to be "so utterly unreasonable and so extravagant in nature
and purpose as to capriciously interfere with and destroy public
rights."' 9
It would seem that the real point of departure between the deci-
sion in the Ives case and the decisions in the courts of the other
states on the compensation legislation lies in the method of construc-
16Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327.
71id., p. 349. See opinion of Barnes, J.: "If the opinion of the court is
intended to mean that it is a doubtful question whether our constitution
should be preserved or thrown in the 'scrap heap,' I do not agree with it."
ISpage 201, N. Y. 271, at p. 305.
'
9See note 14, sufira.
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tion adopted in testing the validity of new legislation under a writ-
ten constitution. The recent decision20 of the New York Court of
Appeals holding valid the compensation act of 1914 seems to sup-
port this view. In the opinion, Miller, J., says: "Much reliance is
placed on the decision of this court in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.
In that case Judge Werner, referring to the appeal on economic
and sociological grounds and speaking for the court, said:
'We have already admitted the strength of this appeal to a
recognized and widely prevalent sentiment, but we think it is an
appeal which must be made to the people and not to the courts.'
That decision was made in March, 1911. Following that sugges-
tion the Legislature provided in the orderly way prescribed by the
Constitution for the submission to the people of a proposed consti-
tutional amendment, and in due time that amendment was adopted
on November 4, 1913, and became section 19, article I, of our state
constitution. It is unnecessary to set that amendment forth in
extenso, but it suffices to say that so far as the due-process clause
or any other provision of our state constitution is concerned the
amendment amply sustains the act."
20Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 N. E. 600, at p. 602. The opinion ends
with this sentence: "The decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
notably in the Noble State Bank case, make it reasonably certain that it
(.the law) will be found by that court not to be violative of the Constitu-
tion of the United States," p. 604.
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